THE HON. MRS JUSTICE TIPPLES Approved judgment Greenstein v Campaign Against Antisemitism [2020] EWHC 2951 (QB) 62. However, the defendant has not sought to strike out this claim on the basis that it discloses no reasonable basis for bring the claim under the 1998 Act or for summary judgment on the basis that the claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on this claim. Indeed, were this not the case, the defendant would not have needed to have recourse to the Jameel jurisdiction to strike out the claim (see Alsaifi v Trinity Mirror Plc, [2018] EWHC 1954 (QB), Nicklin J (“Alsaifi”) at [46]). 63. In Alsaifi Nicklin J explained that “at heart of any assessment of whether a claim is Jameel abusive is an assessment of two things: (1) what is the value of what is legitimately sought to be obtained by the proceedings; and (2) what is the likely cost of achieving it?” (see [44]). Further, more recently the same judge in Tinkler v Ferguson [2020] 4 WLR 89 explained: “47. Nevertheless, the Jameel jurisdiction to strike out claims as abusive ought to be reserved for exceptional cases: Stelios Haji-Ioannou v Dixon [2009] EWHC 178 (QB) [30], per Sharp J. Courts should not be too ready to conclude that continued litigation of the claim would be disproportionate to what could be legitimately achieved. The conclusion must be that it is impossible “to fashion any procedure by which that claim can be adjudicated in a proportionate way”: Ames v Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 3409 [33]-[36] per Warby J, citing Sullivan v Bristol Film Studios [29]-[32] per Lewison LJ.” 64. I see the force in Mr Speker’s submissions that, if I am against the claimant on the fourth alleged libel (which I am), then the value of what is legitimately sought to be obtained from the pursuit of this claim may be very little, if any (ie because there is no actual or prospective harm to the claimant). However, I do not have any information or evidence in relation to the cost of pursuing this claim and, without any such evidence, I am not in a position to reach any view that the continued litigation of this claim is disproportionate or that this is an exceptional case in which the Jameel jurisdiction should be exercised. Therefore, save for paragraph 7.2 of the amended particulars of claim, I refuse the defendant’s application to strike out this claim. Claim in misuse of private information 65. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the amended particulars of claim the claimant alleges: “8. Further the claimant’s personal data is private information, information which falls within the scope of the claimant’s private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and/or information in which the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The publication of the claimant’s private information by the defendant in the circumstances set out above is an actionable misuse of the claimant’s private information for which the defendant has no justification. 2 0