THE HON. MRS JUSTICE TIPPLES Approved judgment Greenstein v Campaign Against Antisemitism [2020] EWHC 2951 (QB) 7.3.2. none of the conditions in schedule 2 or schedule 3 to the Act is met. 7.4 The processing of the claimant’s data by the defendant has caused and continues to cause distress, hurt and intense embarrassment to the claimant.” 58. The defendant accepts that it is a data controller processing personal information in relation to the claimant on its website. 59. The defendant’s application that this claim should be struck out is made on the basis that what remains of the claimant’s case should be struck out “because to allow it to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court” (paragraph 3(4) of the defendant’s application notice; paragraph 25 of the amended defence). The application is therefore based on the Jameel jurisdiction. The reference in the application notice at paragraph 3(4) to CPR Part 3.4(2)(c) is, it appears, a typographical error as it is CPR 3.4(2)(b) which refers to the court’s jurisdiction to strike out a statement of case if it appears “the statement of case is an abuse of the court process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of proceedings”. The defendant also relies on the evidence in paragraph 42 of Mr Falter’s witness statement in which he says “there is a good reason to believe that Mr Greenstein is not even bringing this claim to vindicate his own reputation but rather it is part of his fight to discredit the [IDA] definition and CAA” and he then produces and refers to a document written by the claimant entitled “Why I am Suing the Campaign Against Anti-Semitism for Libel and Why I Am Asking for Your Help”. 60. The claimant takes a point on the defendant’s application notice and submits that the defendant has failed to apply for summary judgment or strike out the claimant’s case under the 1998 Act (eg. as disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim under CPR Part 3.4(a)). The claimant also maintains that he is entitled to recover damages for the reputational harm and damage he has suffered (see Aven v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd [2020] EWHC 1812 (QB), Warby J at [197]), the claim under the 1998 Act is not an abuse of process, and should be allowed to proceed to trial. Further, the claimant disputes Mr Falter’s evidence in relation to abuse of process and the purpose of the proceedings (see, for example, paragraphs 135 and 136 of his witness statement). 61. The starting point, in respect of information disclosed in legal proceedings held in public, is that a person will not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy (see NT1 v Google llc (Information Commissioner intervening) [2018] 3 WLR 1165, Warby J (“NT1 v Google”) at [166(2) to (3)]). Therefore, if a person wishes to allege a right to privacy in respect of such information, it is necessary to particularise the basis on which, as a result of the balancing exercise identified in NT1 v Google, that information has become private. In this case, the claimant has identified the age of the convictions, but no other particulars are provided. 1 9