Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Ismaik v Fadaat Media would readily notice and grasp. Without descending into the lawyerly technicalities of the test for prosecution (in the UK or elsewhere), an ordinary reader would easily in such a context understand that prosecution is being distinguished from conviction here; it reflects a prosecution authority’s decision that it has enough reason to put to a case to court for trial and determination of criminal guilt, not necessarily that a defendant must be understood to be guilty – in its opinion or at all. No timeline or historical perspective is given, so in my view, the ordinary and natural imputation here is that Mr Ismaik was prosecuted but not convicted in a major money laundering case (either because he was acquitted or because the trial has yet to conclude). 35. In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of this allegation is that: Mr Ismaik was prosecuted in a major money laundering case. That is an allegation of fact at Chase level 2: there were reasonable grounds to suspect him of having done what he was alleged to have done, otherwise the matter would not have got as far as prosecution. The article does not say what part he was alleged to have played in that case, whether he was prosecuted alone or with others, when he was prosecuted, or anything else. But on any basis, an allegation of reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in ‘major’ money laundering, whatever that involvement might have been, is clearly defamatory. It is an allegation of grounds for suspecting at least complicity in a grave violation of the criminal law, which would undoubtedly significantly lower a person in others’ estimation. (iv) The ‘image reshaping’ allegation 36. The second paragraph tells the reader Mr Ismaik has ‘naturally’ been ‘busy reshaping his image’ by making donations to the poor and to students and by supporting foundations. He had acquired great wealth and was ‘attempting to create a new image’. In particular, he is said to have ‘used the paid search facilities of Google for the purposes of self-promotion and to hide court rulings and prosecutions he had been subject to.’ This is said to be ‘understandable’ enough, given the two criminal allegations (conviction and prosecution) and an attempt to improve his image. 37. There is not a great distance between the parties as to the natural and ordinary meaning of this allegation, but Mr Ismaik fears it conveys an imputation that he is ‘deceptive and dishonest’, hiding his past criminal cases and producing a publicly misleading impression of who he is. 38. I am clear an ordinary reader of this article would not be so naïve as to think powerful and wealthy individuals and bodies as a general rule have any practice of full online disclosure, or that there is any shared societal expectation that they do or should. On the contrary, ordinary readers know that everyone is free to try to influence, so far as they can and want to, what is searchable online about them, and that high-profile individuals may be both strongly motivated and well-resourced to do so. So I am not persuaded there is a natural and ordinary imputation of deception or dishonesty in an allegation that someone has ‘curated’ (to use a neutral term) their online presence as delivered by the algorithms of search engines. 39. Image control by the influential is a fact of contemporary life. It is well-known that possibilities exist, whether or not for payment, to influence the outcome of search