Claimant and the fact of such agreement is an indicator was that this was not an unambiguous or unequivocal delivery of a gift to the charity. 77. Here it is clear that in December 2004, the Claimant was anxious that any transactions that he had with Trust through the First Defendant should be recorded in writing. The First Defendant agreed and drew up the text of the agreement, albeit that the parties to it had already been identified by the Claimant. It is an unusual procedure for a gift, where the donor can merely transfer the sum usually accompanied by a clear expression of charitable intent. Those who give sums to charity may also claim tax relief on it, although as Mr Weiss acknowledged they will usually require a receipt or other formal proof of the gift to do so. In my judgment the fact that an agreement was being drawn up at all, in contrast to the transaction in October suggests either some circumspection by the Claimant in dealing with the First Defendant a second time with respect to the Trust or that a more complex transaction was envisaged. 78. Such an indication is reinforced by the absence of a letter of thanks or receipt for what would be an extremely generous donation, and on the Defendant’s case a further donation, amounting in total to some £522,000 made over between October and December 2004. I do not accept that the absence of a receipt is to be explained by uncertainty as to who to make it out to. Neither the Trust nor any of the Defendants had dealings with the Claimant’s property companies. They only had dealings with the Claimant. It was the Claimant who identified the parties to the agreement signed by both parties in December and if any acknowledgement of delivery and receipt was to be made it was to the Claimant who had made the transfer of both sums. 79. Further, making every allowance for the fact that this was a hastily drawn up document, written in Hebrew by parties whose first language is Yiddish, there are a number of clear pointers in the text away from this being a donation to charity:i. The fact that two sums were specified rather than one, suggests that the two sums had different destinations and different purposes. This is more consistent with the Claimant’s case that the first sum was a currency exchange transaction and the second sum was a loan in connection with property works the charity was undertaking in Stamford Hill. On the Defendants’ case, all the funds were going to the charity’s beneficiaries in Israel and there would be no point in making a distinction between the two sums. Even if the First Defendant is right that there had been no precise agreement as to the sum to be transferred before the 23rd December meeting, the expectation was a significant sum similar to the previous transaction of October 2005 for £200,000. On the First Defendant’s case therefore the additional sum would be a fortunate and unanticipated windfall given for no particular reason. ii. The precise amount of the first sum, of £120,445.59 strongly suggests that it was arrived at by converting back a sum of $250,000 at an exchange range of about 1.96 dollars to the pound with a variable third or fourth decimal point. The First Defendant would have known what rate the charity could obtain for its inter-account transfers and would have been able to make the calculation as the Claimant suggests. The Claimant would not have known what rates were available to the