were the reason for the breakdown of his marriage. It is equally clear that the next objects of Bane’s delusions were his sister and his mother, and by the end of 1984 it is common ground that his delusional belief system was fully established. In those circumstances I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that Bane’s decision to exclude Jovanka in favour of Mr Wigmore was uninfluenced by his delusions. Indeed, I think, on balance, that it probably was so influenced. Accordingly, I must conclude that Bane already lacked testamentary capacity when he made the 1984 Codicil, with the consequence that it too cannot stand. 233. I return finally to the question of law which I identified at the start of this judgment in paragraph 15. In view of the conclusions which I have reached, it is unnecessary for me to resolve it because it would make no difference to the result. The question is one of some interest, and I heard full argument on it; but anything I said on the subject would be obiter, and I think it better to leave its resolution to a case where it would make a difference to the outcome. I would only say that the point is very seldom likely to be of any practical significance, because it must be a rare case indeed where the Court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that a testator’s delusions did not in fact influence the dispositions in his will, but nevertheless considers that the delusions were likely to influence them. It is perhaps for this reason that the question does not seem to have troubled the Courts over the 137 years since Banks v Goodfellow was decided in July 1870. Conclusion 234. For the reasons which I have given, this action succeeds and I will pronounce against the 1989 Will, the 1988 Will and 1984 Codicil. It follows that probate must be granted of the 1974 Will. It also follows that none of the questions of construction which would need to be decided if the 1989 Will were valid need to be decided.