THE HON. MRS JUSTICE TIPPLES Approved judgment Greenstein v Campaign Against Antisemitism [2020] EWHC 2951 (QB) 52. The defendant, on the other hand, maintains that the claimant’s plea that the dominant and improper motive of referring to the claimant’s convictions was to smear the claimant is hopeless and the particulars in paragraph 26 of the amended reply do not set up a case more probative of the existence of malice than its nonexistence. 53. The first point the defendant makes is that the inclusion of the convictions was explained in the First Article itself: “[1.11] Mr Greenstein is not above lying. In letters to The Guardian he has stated that the International Definition of Antisemitism prevents criticism of Israel, when, in fact, it explicitly states that it does not, confirming that: “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” He has claimed that Campaign Against Antisemitism is a lobby group acting on behalf of the Israeli government, a ridiculous allegation that would not stand up to any examination or audit. In this context, then, it is entirely relevant to mention that Mr Greenstein has previous criminal form for brazen deception, having past convictions for credit card theft and subsequent use, vandalism, drug possession and a number of other petty crimes…” (underlining added) 54. I agree with the defendant, this reason provided in the article is clearly plausible: it is more likely the claimant is lying because he has dishonesty convictions. Further, there is no basis for the claimant to doubt this conclusion and no such basis is identified in paragraph 26 of the amended reply. 55. The second point relates to the particulars of malice. Mr Mitchell dealt with malice at paragraphs 56 to 67 of his skeleton argument, and also in his oral submissions. However, he did not address in any detail the specific criticisms of his pleading made by Mr Speker at paragraph 55 of his skeleton argument. Rather, Mr Mitchell submitted this was an obvious attempt to smear the claimant as a criminal and as a character assassination. However, it is necessary to analyse each of the particulars alleged to see whether this is one of those “relatively few cases” where it is possible for the claimant to set up a case in malice. In my view it is not, and I agree with the submissions made by Mr Speker in relation to paragraph 26 of the amended reply: a. Paragraph 26(1) is mere assertion. b. Paragraph 26(2) is assertion, and does not support a plea of malice. c. Paragraph 26(3) is irrelevant given the 1974 Act allows reference to spent convictions in the context of a defamation claim, subject to proof of malice. d. Paragraph 26(4) is correct but does not support a plea of malice; 1 7