THE HON. MRS JUSTICE TIPPLES Approved judgment Greenstein v Campaign Against Antisemitism [2020] EWHC 2951 (QB) be granted where there is no prospect that a claimant will succeed in proving malice (see, for example, Carruthers at [32]). b. The approach the court should adopt when considering applications for summary judgment is set out in Easy Air Limited v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) (and approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Son v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098 at [24]). Summary judgment is for plain cases that are not fit for trial: Suresh v Samad [2017] EWHC 76 (QB), Warby J at [10(4)]. c. The court can exercise its powers to strike out a statement of case under CPR 3.4(2)(b) in respect of a defamation claim where the litigation is pointless and wasteful or “[does] not serve the legitimate purpose of protecting the claimant’s reputation” as such a claim is an abuse of process: see Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946, CA; Lait v Evening Standard Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 2973, CA at [42]; Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th Edition; 2013) (“Gatley”) at para 30.48 – Proceedings which are not “worth the candle”; Jameel abuse of process). Defence of honest opinion 15. The defence of honest opinion is now contained in section 3 of the 2013 Act, and the old common law defence has been abolished: section 3(8). Section 3, so far as material, provides: “(1) It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that the following conditions are met. (2) The first condition is that the statement complained of was a statement of opinion. (3) The second condition is that the statement complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of opinion. (4) The third condition is that an honest person could have held the opinion on the basis of – (a) any fact which existed at the time the statement complained of was published; … (5) The defence is defeated if the claimant shows that the defendant did not hold the opinion …” 16. It is only sub-sections 3(4)(a) and 3(5) that are relevant in relation to the defendant’s application. This, again, was common ground between the parties. The first condition was determined by Nicklin J (see paragraph 3 above) and the claimant does not challenge that the second condition is met (see [2019] EWHC 281 (QB) at [30] to [31], [39] and [41]). 6