and not “privately held belief”, therefore subjective evidence of intent is not admissible. 46. The most contentious part of Judge van Gestel’s report and his responses to Part 35 questions related to the contra preferentem rule. Mr. Darton submitted that in Massechusetts law, it was a much stronger rule that it is in English law. Mr. Darton submitted that if the words were clear, then there was no difficulty, the court should give the words their natural and ordinary meaning. Where there was an ambiguity, then the contra preferentem rule should apply and the clause (in this case clause 8) should be construed against the Claimant who drafted the contract without the court looking at extrinsic evidence at all. This was partly an application of the contra preferentem rule and partly an application of the integration clause (clause 11). 47. Mr. Oliver submitted that this misrepresented Judge van Gestel’s opinion. The Claimant’s part 35 question on these points asked whether his views on clause 11 should be refined as clause 11 only barred prior understandings and agreements and not reference to negotiations. In particular, he was asked to comment on the case of Amicas Inc v GMG Health Systems, 676 F. 3d 277. He was also asked to consider whether there were any limits to the principle of construing ambiguity against the drafter and how his view fitted in with his earlier opinion about the use of extrinsic evidence to resolve issues of ambiguity. 48. Judge van Gestel responded, in answer to both questions, that not all cases of ambiguity led to a construction against the drafter. “Once the contract is determined to be ambiguous, the court is free to look at extrinsic evidence …. In order to give a reasonable construction in the light of the intention of the parties at the time of formation of the contract …” Construction of an ambiguity against the drafter is only a last resort and where justice and equity demand it. 49. I do not agree with Mr. Darton’s submission that, even if there is an ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is not admissible because the contra preferentem rule operates and the contract is immediately construed against the drafter. Judge van Gestel has modified his view, and this is perhaps not surprising given the very short period of time that was available to deal with this expert evidence and the subsequent part 35 questions. It is a last resort but doesn’t prevent the court looking at extrinsic evidence if there is an ambiguity, at least in the first place. 50. Judge van Gestel did not expressly answer the question about Clause 11 of the agreement (the integration clause). The Amacas case touches on the point. There it was argued on appeal that evidence from the negotiations would be admissible to resolve an ambiguity in the contract. The court decided that there was no ambiguity, and therefore the point did not arise for decision. In my judgment, it is important to read Judge van Gestel’s original opinion on this point carefully. He has not said that Clause 11 prevents the use of extrinsic evidence to resolve an ambiguity in the meaning of a word in the contract. His opinion was asked in answer to the question whether subjective evidence of intention was admissible, as appeared from the negotiations or subsequent conduct. It was in this context that he was referring to Clause 11, which of course precludes recourse to any earlier agreements or understandings. I do not read his evidence as saying that Clause 11 does other than provide that evidence of the negotiations is not admissible to give evidence of an understanding or prior agreement. It is also for this court to construe Clause 11, with