prejudice, and (b) benefits that the proposed disclosure would (or would be likely to or may) cause or promote. 75. Christopher Martin Hogan and Oxford City Council v the Information Commissioner EA/2005/0026&0030 provides authority for the consideration of the PIBT. In Hogan the following guidance was set out (from 29):“29 First, there is a need to identify the applicable interest(s) within the relevant exemption…” “30 Second, the nature of the ‘prejudice’ being claimed must be considered. An evidential burden rests with the decision maker to be able to show that some causal relationship exists between the potential disclosure and the prejudice and that the prejudice is...“real, actual or of substance”... “34 A third step for the decision-maker concerns the likelihood of occurrence of prejudice...the chance of prejudice being suffered should be more than a hypothetical or remote possibility; there must have been a real and significant risk. 76. Hogan also notes that in considering prejudice a public authority needs to consider the issue in the context that any disclosure will be to the world (para 31), that the FOIA jurisdiction is “motive blind” and that a public authority is required to give consideration to the possibility of “removing exempt information, while disclosing all non-exempt information.” 77. The parties in this Appeal made a number of submissions about Hogan. In our view Hogan does apply for the purposes of the consideration of the PIBT but not prior to that when considering the reasonableness of the QPO. 78. We noted additional submissions made by the Appellant relating to section 36 for example of 16 May 2023 and 23 June 2023. 79. The Appellant says that section 36(2)(c) FOIA cannot be engaged if UoE also seeks to rely on sections 40(2) and/or 41. The Appellant concludes (A238):“There is thus an extremely long line of case law, confirmed in numerous branches of the law, in support of the principle that a general clause cannot be employed to extend the ambit of a specific clause in the same statute, or (what is essentially the same thing in different words) to circumvent the mandatory conditions attached to that specific clause. The Central Lancashire decision is simply an application of that principle to FOIA: generalia specialibus non derogant. All this shows that the University’s attempt to use Section 36(2)(c) to extend the ambit of Section 40(2) and/or 41, circumventing the mandatory conditions imposed 21