about the burden of proof in relation to alternative sites. The first to third sentences of IR 15.64 are unobjectionable and the Trust makes no complaint about them. Mr Drabble focusses on the fourth sentence “in order that it may garner significant weight, the merits of such alternatives must, logically, be underpinned by a good measure of evidence demonstrating their viability and credibility as such an alternative.501 [8.62, 9.65]”. However, at the end of the sentence, the Inspector inserts a footnote and two cross references. The footnote refers to Trusthouse Forte Hotels Ltd v Secretary of State for Environment (1987) 57 P. & C.R. 293. The first cross-reference is to IR 8.62 where the Inspector records Westminster Council’s submission, supported by the Council’s reference to Trusthouse Forte, that the absence of detailed and worked up alternatives before the inquiry is not a reason for discounting alternative sites: “WCC believes that the absence of detailed and worked up alternatives before the Inquiry is not a reason for discounting this principle, as the Court said “Although generally speaking it is desirable and preferable that a planning authority (including, of course, the Secretary of State on appeal) should identify and consider that possibility by reference to specifically identifiable alternative sites, it will not always be essential or indeed necessarily appropriate to do so””. 145. He also cross-referred to IR 9.65 recording the submission by the Trust, made again by reference to Trusthouse Forte that “[i]t is not accepted that the existence of an alternative proposal or site is only a material consideration if there is a specific scheme in existence (such as occurs in a conjoined planning appeal or otherwise)”. 146. The Inspector’s approach accords with Trusthouse Forte and reflects “the spectrum” explained in Langley Park per Sullivan LJ at [52] – [53] that “how far evidence in support of [a] possibility, or the lack of it, should have been worked up by the objectors or the applicant for permission [are] all matters of planning judgment”. His approach at IR 15.164 is an example of the application of planning judgment to that question as it arose in the case before him. He expressly recognises that it is not necessary for a specific alternative site to be placed before the inquiry ( “though not always essential”) before indicating, unremarkably, that the weight to be given to a proposed alternative will be affected by the evidence of its credibility and viability as an alternative vehicle to meet the need for which the proposed development has been brought forward. The Trust does not identify any authority for the proposition that the credibility and viability of delivery of a proposed alternative is not relevant to the evaluation of an alternative site. It is simply as aspect of the Inspector’s planning judgment. 147. Accordingly, I accept Mr Mould’s submission that it is incorrect to characterise the Inspector’s approach as being to place a burden on objectors to produce a detailed scheme for an alternative location for the proposed development. In the light of the authorities, it was legally permissible for him to evaluate the strength of the case for rejecting the planning application before the Minister by considering (amongst other 54