all the circumstances, compliance with that provision is incompatible with the special purposes …”. Again interference with free speech must be justifiable and proportionate, there must be “careful management so as to ensure that the litigation process … is not used as a means of stifling criticism under the guise of correcting inaccuracy”, see Prince Moulay Hicham v Elaph Publishing [2017] EWCA Civ 29; [2017] 4 WLR 28. 118. Section 13 provides that an individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of the DPA is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that damage. Damage includes nonpecuniary damage including distress, see Vidal-Hall v Google [2016] QB 1003 which set out the proper approach to section 13(2) of the DPA. In paragraphs 81 and 82 of Vidal-Hall it was noted that there would be some cases which did not justify an award of damages. Section 14 provides that the Court may order rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction of data and notification of such actions to third parties to whom the data has been disclosed. Although in Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance [2013] EWCA Civ 333 the sum of £750 awarded by way of damages was described as a “relatively modest nature” more substantial sums have been awarded where there was a deliberate breach of the DPA (£9,000 in one case) or where control of personal and confidential information which should never have been processed had been lost (£39,5000 shared amongst 6 Claimants in TLT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2217 (QB)). 119. It is permissible to bring claims under the DPA together with claims for libel because the DPA provides for a statutory cause of action, see Hicham v Elaph Publishing. However where it can be seen at the conclusion of the trial that the DPA claim adds nothing to the existing proceedings, it may be appropriate either to make no order on the claim or to dismiss it. It might be noted that the focus of libel proceedings under the Defamation Act 2013 is serious harm to reputation, whereas the DPA is concerned with, among other matters, accuracy and the fairness of the processing of data. DPA claim adds nothing – paragraphs 9(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) 120. Mr Wolanski and Mr Speker agreed that the claim under the DPA might require to be addressed in very particular circumstances, for example if the claim for libel had succeeded on all grounds but failed because there was no finding of serious harm. In the circumstances where the claim for libel has succeeded it is not necessary to address this claim separately and I do not do so. Conclusion 121. For the detailed reasons set out above I find that: (1) the claim for libel in respect of the online article succeeds and I award damages of £30,000 and an injunction to restrain further publication of the online article; (2) I dismiss the claim for malicious falsehood; and (3) it is not necessary to address the claims under the DPA given my finding on the claim for libel. 122. I am very grateful to Mr Speker and Mr Wolanski, and their respective legal teams, for their excellent written and oral submissions.