information about a celebrity’s private life has been widely published it may serve no useful purpose to prohibit further publication. The same will not necessarily be true of photographs. Insofar as a photograph does more than convey information and intrudes on privacy by enabling the viewer to focus on intimate personal detail, there will be a fresh intrusion of privacy when each additional viewer sees the photograph and even when one who has seen a previous publication of the photograph is confronted by a fresh publication of it. To take an example, if a film star were photographed, with the aid of a telephoto lens, lying naked by her private swimming pool, we question whether widespread publication of the photograph by a popular newspaper would provide a defence to a legal challenge to repeated publication on the ground that the information was in the public domain. There is thus a further important potential distinction between the law relating to private information and that relating to other types of confidential information.” It has been recognised for some time that personal and private information is not always to be treated in exactly the same way as commercial secrets, which can generally be assessed according to a bright line boundary between what is in the public domain and what is not: see e.g. the remarks of Lord Keith in AttorneyGeneral v. Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 260E-H; R v. Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex parte Granada TV [1995] EMLR 163; WB v. H Bauer Publishing [2002] EMLR 145. 26. The extent to which material is truly “in the public domain” will ultimately depend upon the particular facts before the Court. In Attorney-General v. Greater Manchester Newspapers Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 32 (Dec) the test was applied as to whether certain information was “realistically” accessible to members of the public or only “in theory”. 27. I need to bear in mind, on an application of this kind, the provisions of s.12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and, in particular, that before granting relief of an interim nature I must be satisfied that the claimant would be likely to obtain similar relief on a permanent basis at trial. It follows that I have to try to form a view of the overall merits of the privacy claim on incomplete evidence. 28. The methodology to be applied has become very well established over the last few years, and especially in the light of Campbell (cited above) and Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593. The following principles need to be borne in mind in any case where it is sought to restrain publication on the basis of an alleged infringement of rights guaranteed by Article 8, and where they come into conflict with those of other persons, and in particular the rights of the media to freedom of expression and, correspondingly, the right of the public to be informed about maters of public interest: i) No Convention right has, as such, precedence over another;