Judgment approved by the court for handing down Mr J Logo v Payone Gmbh and others they were principles of law, should cease. The proposition of law for which Robertson is authority is that the Employment Tribunal has a wide discretion to extend time on just and equitable grounds. Our judgment upholding the decision of an Employment Tribunal not to extend time was overturned by the Court of Appeal on the basis that we should have concluded that the decision of the Employment Tribunal was perverse, but our approach to the law was not criticised: Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2024] EWCA Civ 1568, [2025] I.C.R. 738. Bean LJ summarised the key authorities: 27. The EAT referred to the well-known judgment of Auld LJ in Bexley Community Centre (trading as Leisure Link) v Robertson [2003] IRLR 434, at paras 23–24 : “If the claim is out of time there is no jurisdiction to consider it unless the tribunal considers that is just and equitable in the circumstances to do so. That is essentially a question of fact and judgment for the tribunal to determine … The tribunal, when considering the exercise of its discretion, has a wide ambit within which to reach a decision.” 28. In Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston [2010] IRLR 327 , Wall LJ at para 24 said that Robertson emphasises the wide discretion which the ET has. Sedley LJ said at para 31: “There is no principle of law which dictates how generously or sparingly the power to enlarge time is to be exercised. In certain fields (the lodging of notices of appeal at the EAT is a well-known example), policy has led to a consistently sparing use of the power. That has not happened, and ought not to happen in relation to the power to enlarge the time for bringing ET proceedings.” 29. In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan [2018] ICR 1194 Leggatt LJ, with whom I agreed, said: “18. First, it is plain from the language used (‘such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable’) that Parliament has chosen to give the employment tribunal the widest possible discretion. Unlike section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 , section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 does not specify any list of factors to which the tribunal is instructed to have regard, and it would be wrong in these circumstances to put a gloss on the words of the provision or to interpret it as if it contains such a list. Thus, although it has been suggested that it may be useful for a tribunal in exercising its discretion to consider the list of factors specified in section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 (see British Coal Corpn v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336 ), the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the tribunal is not required to go through such a list, the only requirement being that it does not leave a significant factor out of account: see Southwark London Borough Council v Afolabi [2003] ICR 800, para 33 . The position is analogous to that where a court or tribunal is exercising the similarly worded discretion to extend the time for bringing © EAT 2025 Page 10 [2025] EAT 95