Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Solicitor General v Millinder prohibition, and of the sanctions for breach, in advance of the hearing. This enables the orderly administration of justice. 33. Bearing in mind and giving due weight to the principle of open justice, notwithstanding the complete absence of any access request and the failure to follow the requisite procedure, the Divisional Court was prepared to consider making a direction under section 85A. Therefore, on learning that Mr Millinder had shared the link with four other individuals, whose names were supplied but who did not turn on their cameras, each of those individuals was asked in turn to supply the Court with their email addresses and to unmute their microphones so that they could confirm (orally) that they understood that they were not allowed to record or transmit the proceedings. There was no response to those requests. 34. These proceedings did not raise any particular issues of wider public importance, and the media and the general public were able to attend the hearing in open court. The Court had no idea of the whereabouts of the individuals to whom Mr Millinder had passed on the link, and they were clearly unwilling to sufficiently identify themselves remotely, a statutory requirement which cannot be relaxed. The Court was far from satisfied that affording remote access to individuals associated with Mr Millinder who were not prepared to even engage with the Court’s requests for belated compliance with the statutory requirements, would be compatible with the interests of justice. 35. In those circumstances, the Court was not prepared to make a direction for remote observation of its own motion. It therefore directed that the links be terminated to all but one of the individuals, a Mr Walsh, whose company Deuda Ltd had made an application which was listed to be heard on the same occasion as the contempt proceedings, and who might therefore be legitimately characterised as a participant. Mr Walsh was given the opportunity to make representations in respect of that application, which was dismissed for reasons given in a short ex tempore judgment delivered orally at the hearing. Recusal 36. Shortly before the hearing, an email was sent by Mr Millinder to the Administrative Court Office which, among other matters, said the following: “I note that Andrews LJ has been re-installed into this case, acting knowingly in conflict. I allege that Andrews LJ perverted the course of justice by suppressing all my evidence of criminality during the void s.42 proceedings. The evidence supports that conclusion. Judges who collude and pervert the course of public justice, acting with favour and ill-will to conceal criminality are not judges, they are criminal offenders. You, Andrews LJ, are proven to have done that …. The Court is not properly constituted.” 37. In the light of this missive, I inquired of Mr Millinder at the start of the hearing whether he was asking me to recuse myself from hearing the committal application on the basis that I had been a member of the constitution of the Divisional Court which made the section 42 order. Mr Millinder said no, he was not objecting to my hearing the application, although that was not going to stop him from repeating his allegation that I had conspired to pervert the course of justice. 9