Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Solicitor General v Millinder exhausted his rights of appeal and the order has been upheld. However, even if an appeal is successful, the order under challenge remains valid and must be complied with unless a stay has been granted, until such time as the appeal court sets it aside. 69. Mr Millinder contends that this was wrong because of certain observations made by Lord Denning in MacFoy v United Africa Ltd [1962] AC 152, an appeal to the Privy Council from the West African Court of Appeal. The issue in that case was whether a statement of claim, delivered in the long vacation (which in those days was not permitted under the procedural rules) was a nullity. The appellant contended that it was, and that all subsequent proceedings were void. His appeal was dismissed. Lord Denning, delivering the judgment of their Lordships, said at page 160: “The defendant here sought to say therefore that the delivery of the statement of claim in the long vacation was a nullity and not a mere irregularity. This is the same as saying that it was void and not merely voidable. The distinction between the two has been repeatedly drawn. If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of the court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without more ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.” 70. Lord Denning’s observations, which were obiter, and made in a case which is only of persuasive authority, were directed specifically at the validity of acts by individuals, such as the service of proceedings. He was not considering , let alone alluding to, orders of the court, which are treated as valid for all purposes unless and until they are set aside. Mr Millinder has exhausted his rights of challenge to the various court orders of which he complains, including those made in the insolvency proceedings; although he refuses to accept it, there must be finality in litigation. 71. The Court made it clear at the hearing of the committal proceedings that it was not prepared to allow Mr Millinder to rehearse the same arguments concerning the underlying litigation that he had rehearsed at length in his written submissions, and which had been aired extensively both at the section 42 hearing and on previous occasions, including before the Chancellor and before Mr Justice Fancourt. When it was put to him, Mr Millinder had no answer to the point that he had unsuccessfully sought to persuade the Court of Appeal that it was arguable that the section 42 order was void or that there had been a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by the members of the Divisional Court who made that order (or by any other judges). 72. Even if the person who breaches the order genuinely believes that he is entitled to do the acts complained of, that will afford him no defence: see Khawaja v Popat & Another [2016] EWCA Civ 362 per Lord Justice McCombe at [32] and the authorities there cited. 73. It was made clear to Mr Millinder that the Court was willing to listen to anything that he wished to say by way of excuse or mitigation which did not involve repetition of the arguments that had been aired and dismissed on previous occasions. However, when he was told that the Court was not prepared to listen to arguments which had no 19