the Act of Parliament in question. The conclusion which I reach is that to allow a wider power of investment is to confer additional powers of investment and is not, therefore, inconsistent with but is in aid of and supplemental to the powers of investment which are conferred by section 11 of the Act. On that view it would be open to the court to allow what has been done by settling a scheme conferring the necessary powers.” 27. These cases were considered by Buckley LJ in Construction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General [1973] Ch 173 where he said (p.187): “It has long been recognised that, where a charity is established by an Act of Parliament, the court will not exercise its jurisdiction in any way which will conflict with the provisions of the Act (In re Shrewsbury Grammar School (1849) 1 Mac. & G. 324, 333), but this does not mean that in such a case the jurisdiction of the court is entirely ousted. In In re Shipwrecked Fishermen and Mariners' Royal Benevolent Society [1959] Ch. 220, Danckwerts J. expressed the view (in which I respectfully concur) that the court has power to sanction a scheme in relation to a charity established by an Act of Parliament in respect of matters not in conflict with the provisions of the Act, and even in respect of those matters which are regulated by Act of Parliament the court can entertain an application by charity trustees to consider whether they should apply to Parliament for an amending Act: In re Shrewsbury Grammar School, 1 Mac. & G. 324. It seems that the position may be similar in the case of a charity incorporated by Royal Charter: In re Whitworth Art Gallery Trusts [1958] Ch. 461.” 28. Thus the distinction is drawn between those cases where the relevant Act prohibits what is sought to be done and those, where no statutory prohibition is imposed but the trustees seek powers going beyond what is expressly authorised. The Court may intervene in the latter case but not the former. In this connection it is convenient to record that Counsel for the Attorney-General accepted that if a claim is made for restitution of an object comprised in the collection of the Museum it may be compromised on terms which include a disposal of the object by the Trustees in favour of the claimant. In such a case if the claim had been made good it would have been established that the object in question was not and never had been an object to which the prohibition contained in s.3(4) applied. I can see nothing wrong with a bona fide compromise to that effect, compare Binder v Alachouzos [1972] 2 QB 151. 29. In relation to his second submission counsel for the Attorney-General referred me to Attorney-General v Great Eastern Railway Co. (1880) 5 App.Cas.473 and the citations with approval from the speeches of Lords Blackburn and Selborne made by Lord Templeman in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC [1992] 2 AC 1, 29. I did not understand counsel for either the Trustees or CLAE to dispute the proposition in support of which these citations were relied on. I accept the proposition. 30. In relation to his third submission counsel for the Attorney-General referred me to National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31. At pages 50 and 62 Lords Wright and Simonds quoted with approval from Tyssen on Charitable Bequests 1st Ed. 176/7