6. Before the claim was put before the Spoliation Advisory Panel the Trustees sought the advice of counsel and in implementation of that advice wrote to the Attorney-General on 29th August 2003. The Trustees expressed the view that: “..if the Attorney-General were to take a positive view of his powers to sanction Snowden-type action in relation to objects now comprised in a national collection and subject to an acknowledged holocaust restitution claim, he would offer a straightforward solution to the debate in the present case, in respect of which equity requires a swift solution.” 7. The Attorney-General was concerned whether as a matter of statutory construction the express prohibition contained in s.3(4) British Museum Act 1963 (as amended) on the disposal of objects comprised in the collections of the British Museum prevents the objects to which that prohibition applies from being disposed of under the Re:Snowden principle. To resolve that question he issued the Part 8 claim now before me. It seeks the determination of the Court as to: 1. Whether, as a matter of law, where the Defendants consider that they are under a moral obligation to return an object which forms part of the collections of the British Museum to a previous owner of the object or his heirs by reason of the circumstances leading up to their acquisition of the object, it would be possible for the principle known as the principle in Re: Snowden [1970] Ch. 700 to be applied so as to permit such a return: (a) whether or not the object is one to which s.5(1) or 5(2) British Museum Act 1963 applies? (b) where the object is one to which s.5(1) or 5(2) British Museum Act 1963 applies? (c) at all? 2. Whether, in circumstances where: (a) The Defendants are sued for the return of an object comprised in its collections by the object’s former owner or his successors; and (b) But for the provisions of the British Museum Act 1963 the principle in Re: Snowden might have been applied so as to permit such return of the object, the Defendants might properly on the ground (and only on the ground) that they regarded themselves as under a moral obligation to return the object to the person or persons suing them for its return, omit to plead or to rely upon a defence based upon the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 or some earlier Limitation Act which would or might be available to them and, if so, whether they could do so (i) with or (ii) without the approval of H.M. Attorney General. Specifically