“(1)....the Commissioners may by order exercise the same power as is exercisable by the Attorney-General to authorise the charity trustees of a charity – (a) to make any application of property of the charity, or (b) to waive to any extent, on behalf of the charity, its entitlement to receive any property, in a case where the charity trustees – (i) (apart from this section) have no power to do so, but (ii) in all the circumstances regard themselves as being under a moral obligation to do so.” The Submissions of Counsel 22. It is common ground that none of the exceptions to the prohibition imposed by s.3(4) is applicable here. None of the drawings is a duplicate, unfit to be retained or useless. None of them was made after 1850 and the person in whose favour the disposition would be made is not another national museum. Counsel for the AttorneyGeneral submitted that in those circumstances the prohibition was absolute and precluded any disposition, whether by act or omission, by the Trustees in favour of the heirs of the late Dr Feldmann. He contended that: (1) The Court will not direct or approve anything which is inconsistent with a statute. (2) The powers of a statutory corporation such as the Trustees extend no further than what is expressly stated in its governing statutes, is necessarily and properly required for carrying into effect the purposes of its incorporation or such as may fairly be regarded as incidental to or consequential on those things which the legislature has authorised. (3) Where Parliament has specified by statute where the public interest lies, neither the Court nor the Attorney-General may take a different view. 23. In relation to the first submission counsel for the Attorney-General referred me to five authorities. I shall take them in chronological order. The first is Re: Shrewsbury Grammar School (1849) 1 Mac & G 324. In that case the trustees had in their hands accumulations of income in excess of what was required to achieve the objects of the charitable trust. The question was how to apply them. Having upheld the contention that what was described as Sir S.Romilly’s Act conferred sufficient jurisdiction to deal with the matter, the Lord Chancellor continued (p.333): “...it is of constant occurrence that the court is asked to inquire whether an Act of Parliament shall be applied for. If it is in regard to such a matter as this court has no jurisdiction to alter,