the appellant regarded as abhorrent. Nevertheless, as Mr Morshead accepted, Article 10 applied. Anyone is entitled to say what he likes of another provided he does not act unlawfully and so commits an offence under, for example, the Public Order Act. Surprising as it may perhaps appear to some, the right of freedom of speech does extend to abuse. Observations, however offensive, are covered. Indeed, as Hoffman, LJ observed in R v Central Television Plc [1994] 3 All ER 641 at 652:“Freedom means … the right to say things which ‘right-thinking people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible. This freedom is subject only to clearly defined exceptions laid down by common law or statute … It cannot be too strongly emphasised that outside the established exceptions … there is no question of balancing freedom of speech against other interests. It is a trump card which always wins.” 37. The Tribunal decided in Paragraph 65 of its decision that ‘by restricting the application of the Code to those other circumstances which are closely allied to a member’s official duties, the interference with Convention rights can be restricted to that which is proportionate to what is necessary in the interests of a democratic society’. It went on in Paragraphs 68 and 69 to explain why it regarded the interference with the right as proportionate and so permitted by Article 10(2). It said:“68. The exchange between the Mayor of London and a journalist which gave rise to this reference took place immediately after the Mayor left a reception at City Hall and began with the journalist asking how the evening had gone. The Mayor chose to make some comment. Although finding that the Mayor was not at that time fulfilling his official duties (they having ceased for the day), the Case Tribunal has no difficulty in saying that the events were sufficiently proximate in time, in place and, so far as the journalist’s question was concerned in content, to mean, that it is proper to regard Paragraph 4 of the Code of Conduct as being applicable to the situation. 69. Bearing in mind that the exchange took place in a public place and that the Respondent knew that his remarks were being recorded the Case Tribunal is doubtful whether any interference with the Respondent’s private life can as a matter of fact be made out. Insofar as the fact that Code of Conduct can result in a member of a local authority having to account for what is said in such circumstances (when as the Case Tribunal found he was not “on duty”) can be seen as an intrusion into his private as opposed to his public life than in the Case Tribunal’s view such interference can be seen as necessary and permitted by law (in the form of the promulgation of the Code), for the protection of the public order and morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 38. I do not accept the reasoning set out in Paragraph 68. The appellant had ceased to act in his official capacity as host of the reception and was leaving the building to go home. He was accosted outside the building, but it does not seem to me to matter when he was approached. It might have been when he reached his front door. Would that have been regarded as sufficiently proximate in time or place? If not, where does he have to be and how long after he has ceased his official duties for such proximity to exist so as to justify the application of the code? The answer in my view is that since he was off duty, there was no basis for finding that what he said was, to use the Tribunal’s words, so closely allied to his official duties as to justify the restraint on his freedom to express himself within the law as forcibly as he thought fit. And the fact that the journalist’s question related to something he had done as mayor cannot produce the alliance that the Tribunal