99. Fourth, when the First Defendant was responding to the BDZ correspondence in December, he was at pains to point out that the transaction concerned the charity and not the First Defendant personally. He did not also point out that they did not concern the Claimant personally but one of his companies. The corporate issue seems only to have arisen in June 2006, when the Defendants instructed professional advisers who had not seen and did not accept the validity of the written agreement examined under the first issue. Outcome: 100. On the findings of fact set out above, I conclude that the Claimant is entitled to succeed for the recovery of the monies transferred plus interest from the date or dates that the loans should have been repaid. I have seen no evidence that interest was agreed to be paid in December. 101. The First Defendant submits that the written agreement was too obscure to have validity as a valid contract, and if the sums transferred were a failed gift, the claim has not been pleaded as a resulting trust and it would be unjust to the charity to have to repay them. It seems that the charity has wound down its fund raising initiatives since June 2006, and has a number of creditors. 102. For the reasons given in reaching the conclusions on the first issue, in my judgment in the case of both transactions neither was intended to be a gift and the legal principles to be considered are not those relating to intended gifts that fail for one reason or another. The First Defendant was either aware or should have been aware that under the arrangements stipulated by the Claimant these sums were repayable. 103. I am conscious that the Second and Third Defendants have personal responsibility for the repayment of these sums by reason of their position as trustees, although they were not party to the terms in which the funds were received or any breach of personal obligation to the Claimant. However, they relied on the First Defendant’s efforts as fund raiser and director for the Trust when it was active and they must take the failures along with the successes, the rough with the smooth. I imagine that there is an apposite Yiddish phrase. 104. The fact that the charity instantaneously transferred the funds to Israel does not make it unjust that they should have to repay them. There is no reason now that its legal obligations have been made clear that it cannot revive its fund raising activities to meet them. 105. I accordingly find for the Claimant on both issues. Postscript 106. I would hope that the bitter controversy this claim has created within the synagogues of Stamford Hill will now abate. The court has not been diverted into engaging with mutual recriminations of unethical behaviour, and has no authority in theological matters. It is, perhaps, possible to draw back from the turmoil of litigation and conclude that both sides may well have thought at the time that they were behaving in the best interest of the charity: the First Defendant in seeking and the Claimant in giving short-term support.