applications forms and I will use best endeavours with Mr Fisher to find you an institution willing to make a loan to you and if successful I will pay the money into your account”. The text is a clear statement of present intention to pay money and moreover that the payment attracts interest. 90. The First Defendant points to the witness statement of Rabbi Wasner that the court received as the Rabbi was unwilling to come to give evidence in a civil court. This suggests that for observant Jews interest can be only charged with rabbinical permission and after a “hettar iskar” or formal agreement had been entered into. The Claimant said that such permission had been given. The First Defendant disputes this. In my judgment, this is not a strong point for the Defendants. If the First Defendant is right, he was proposing to loan the Claimant money that the First Defendant was to receive from Israel and charge 4% interest on it. There was no written to pay interest in the 23rd December document. This too would have required prior rabbinical permission. If the Claimant is right the proposal about interest only arose because a short term loan and a related currency transaction was not honoured by the First Defendant. Interest was here compensation for a breach of an agreement rather than a fresh commercial transaction in its own right. I note that the Claimant was not embarrassed to sue for interest in the BDZ, taking the February 2006 letter as an explanation for the quantum in dollars put forward in December. I further note that the First Defendant’s explanation of the text is not consistent with the explanation pleaded in the defence. 91. I further conclude that the First Defendant’s explanation as to why no receipt for a donation was ever issued to Rabbi Meisels holds no water. There could be no confusion as to who a receipt should be made out to, whatever the ultimate source of the funds. The identity of the transferor was plain both from the agreement and the history of requests made by the First Defendant to the Claimant. The absence of a receipt as an acknowledgement and an expression of thanks for what on any view are very considerable sums of money such a sum is itself significant. I cannot conceive that a charity would not want to be prompt and clear in its expression of thanks for such a sum if it had indeed been given to it. The only person to thank or acknowledge is Rabbi Meisels. 92. Despite the obvious frailties in the Claimant's evidence standing alone I am satisfied of the essential features of his account when set against the documentary support noted above. Taking the evidence as a whole, therefore, I prefer the Claimant’s account to that of the First Defendant and I am driven to conclude that neither transfer made by the Claimant to YLJT was intended to be a gift or took effect as a gift. Whatever the First Defendant may have hoped would turn out to be the result, the terms on which the Claimant was willing to assist the Trust, as reflected in the agreement, should have made it plain to him that the sums transferred were not gifts. The Claimant expected repayment in the short term future either by way of a currency transaction in dollars in Israel or repayment to the accounts of his financial advisers in the United Kingdom. It may well be that these payments were induced on the basis of a profitable introduction to Mr. Fisher with his experience of international remittances and doing business in Israel. That does nothing to undermine the Claimant’s account that these transactions were repayable to him. 93. I have not been assisted in resolving this central issue by an examination either of the Claimant’s performance as a director of his property companies, or the somewhat