they were decisive. In any event, this is not relevant to the decision that the trigger has been operated. This leaves the main issue of whether the Award qualifies. 55. Mr. Darton’s argument is as follows: Clause 8 provides the trigger as being the making of any Award for Claims for Posener Property. The recitals define Posener Property as property of Heinrich held by the JCC. Since the successful award was by the BADV as a result of a claim to the BADV, then it was not property held by the JCC and therefore does not trigger Clause 8. He says that the wording of the contract is clear and unambiguous and therefore extrinsic evidence is not admissible. 56. If he is right, and the contract does not contain an ambiguity, then extrinsic evidence is not admissible according to Massachusetts law. Evidence might however be admissible to determine whether there is an ambiguity. In this case, the background facts explaining the various bodies to whom claims might be made and the claims that were actually being made or were or might be on foot. In other words, the surrounding circumstances. 57. If it hadn’t been for the additional words in Clause 8 added to the earlier draft, then there would be little doubt that Mr. Darton’s construction would be correct. Posener Property is defined by reference to the JCC and Clause 8 would apply to awards by the JCC or the German courts (covering any appeal from a JCC decision). If the JCC rejected a claim but were overruled on appeal then the trigger would operate without argument. 58. The problem in this case is that Clause 8 is an operative clause of the contract. It explicitly provides that the trigger will operate if an award is made by entities other than the JCC – specifically the BADV (it having been conceded that Bundesamt means BADV for this purpose). If Mr. Darton’s construction is right, then the additional words in Clause 8 cannot have been intended ever to have any effect. 59. The definition of Posener Property in the recitals to the first draft contract differs significantly from the definition in the contract. In the former, there was explicit reference to property which might form the subject matter of claims to the Late Applications Fund. The definition in the contract excluded this part and added (including without limitation) Palaistrasse 15, Dresden and Heinrich’s interests in the Falk and Posener Partnerhip. The actual BADV award was to compensate for the business assets of Kesseldorfstrasse 9, Dreson-Lobtau (the Lobtau Store), the real estate compensation having previously been obtained with the services of Dr. Plagemann. While the business assets of the Lobtau Store were not in fact part of the Falk Posener partnership, but vested in Heinrich alone, the expanded definition (with the background factual knowledge that the freehold had been compensated already) shows that the definition was to include business assets as well as real estate. 60. In my judgment, there is a clear conflict between the definition in the recital and the wording of Clause 8. The JCC does not hold property, it is a restitutionary fund as explained earlier. Nor can claims be made to both the JCC and the BADV. If effect is to be given to Clause 8, then the Posener Property definition in the recital does not work because it limits awards to claims before the JCC. That cannot have been the intention of the parties when they signed a contract containing the additional words in Clause 8 and if effect is to be given to Clause 8, there is an ambiguity or doubt as to the definition of Posener Property. In order to resolve that ambiguity, Massechusetts