56. As regards Article 6(1)(f) the Supreme Court in South Lanarkshire Council v
Scottish Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55 (29 July 2013) set out these
three questions at para 18:(i) Is the data controller or third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed
pursuing a legitimate interest or interests?
(ii) Is the processing involved necessary for the purposes of those interests?
(iii) Is the processing unwarranted in this case by reason of prejudice to the rights
and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject?”
57. Interests to be legitimate have to be interests of more than just the requester
(see the UT Decision in Rodriquez Noza-v- the Information Commissioner &
Nursing and Midwifery Council [2015]UKUT 0499 (ACC) at para 24)
58. In Corporate officer of the House of Commons -v Information Commissioner
[2008]EWHC 1084 the Divisional Court said at para 43:“…."necessary" within schedule 2 para 6 of the DPA should reflect the meaning
attributed to it by the European Court of Human Rights when justifying an
interference with a recognised right, namely that there should be a pressing social
need and that the interference was both proportionate as to means and fairly
balanced as to ends…”
59. Reference was also made to the explanation given in The Sunday Times v United
Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245(paragraph 59):
“The court has noted that, while the adjective "necessary", within the meaning
of article 10(2) is not synonymous with "indispensable", neither has it the
flexibility of such expressions as "admissible", "ordinary", "useful", "reasonable"
or "desirable" and that it implies the existence of a "pressing social need."
60. The UT in Goldsmith International Business School -v- The Information
Commissioner and the Home Office [2014] UKUT 0563 (ACC) provided a number of
relevant propositions including:
the test for reasonable necessity comes before the consideration of the
data subjects interests.
reasonable necessity means
“more than desirable but less than
indispensable or absolute necessity.”
"The test of reasonable necessity itself involves the consideration of alternative
measures, and so “a measure would not be necessary if the legitimate aim
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