approach required in cases of “substantial harm … (or total loss of significance …)” (paragraph 195) from that required in cases of “less than substantial harm” (paragraph 196). But the decision-maker is not told how to assess what the “harm” to the heritage asset will be, or what should be taken into account in that exercise or excluded. The policy is in general terms. There is no one approach, suitable for every proposal affecting a “designated heritage asset” or its setting.” 48. On behalf of the Secretary of State, Mr Katkowski suggested that I should approach Bramshill with caution and he submitted that paragraph 74 cited above is obiter. Whilst that might, strictly speaking, be true given the facts of the case, Lindblom LJ’s observations directly concern the interpretation of the test of substantial harm and are, in any event, consistent with a line of authority from the Court of Appeal emphasising the self-effacing role of the Court in respecting the expertise of Planning Inspectors and guarding against undue intervention in policy judgments within their areas of specialist competence which do not lend themselves to judicial analysis. (See in this context Hopkins Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] UKSC 37 and (R (Samuel Smith Old Brewery) v North Yorkshire County Council [2020] PTSR 221)). 49. Before leaving this ground, it is necessary to say a few words about the judgment of Jay J in Bedford Borough Council v Secretary of State [2013] EWHC 2847 (Admin). This is because Mr Drabble submitted the judgment has been misinterpreted, whilst on behalf of the Secretary of State, Mr Katkowski submitted that the ratio of the case is to be found, in part, at the end of paragraph 24 (the impact on significance was required to be serious such that very much if not all of the significance was drained away). 50. In Bedford, the question as to whether the Inspector had misconstrued or misapplied the policy concept of substantial harm was in issue before the Court ([11]). Jay J saw the epithets “substantial” and “serious” as essentially synonymous in the policy context: see [21] and [26]. In [25], he observed that the decision maker was looking for – “… an impact which would have such a serious impact on the significance of the asset that its significance was either vitiated altogether or very much reduced”. 51. Read in context, the final sentence of [24] is Jay J’s encapsulation of the Inspector’s application of the test of substantial harm in the decision letter which was before him to review. 24 “…What the inspector was saying was that for harm to be substantial, the impact on significance was required to be serious such that very much, if not all, of the significance was drained away. 25 Plainly in the context of physical harm, this would apply in the case of demolition or destruction, being a case of total loss. It would also apply to a case of serious damage to the structure of 18