57. Allegations can be published with varying degrees of certainty. These degrees of certainty have been classically analysed at three distinct levels : (i) level 1: the claimant is ‘guilty’ of the conduct alleged; (ii) level 2: there is ‘reason to suspect’ the claimant is guilty of the conduct alleged; and (iii) level 3: there are ‘grounds for investigating whether’ the claimant is guilty of the conduct alleged (see Chase v. News Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ 1722). These levels calibrate the degree of proof required by the defendant in a defence of truth (c.f. e.g. Musa King v. Telegraph Group Ltd [2003] EWCA 1312 (QB) and [2004] EWCA Civ 613). Lucas-Box Meanings 58. In determining the meaning of the material complained of the court is “not limited by the meanings which either the plaintiff or the defendant seeks to place upon the words” (Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147 at 152H). (2) Legal principles – approach to meaning of previous speeches and utterances 59. I turn to consider the legal principles applicable to the second exercise, namely to establishing the meaning of previous speeches and utterances relied upon in support of a defence of justification. I am grateful to Mr Caldecott QC and Ms Jane Phillips for their helpful note on this topic, with which Mr Bennett did not demur. 60. The objective of the first exercise is to determine the artificial ‘single’ meaning which the law requires to be attributed to the WCO. The first exercise is artificial in the sense that in real life there is rarely a ‘single’ meaning and different people may reasonably interpret words in different ways. The rationale for this search for the ‘single’ meaning is elucidated in the well-known passage from Diplock LJ’s judgment in Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 QB 157 at 171-2. (See above) 61. The objective of the second exercise is not so linear, or otherwise constrained by the ‘single’ meaning rule. The Court has far more flexibility. The reason is that the Court is concerned with a quite different exercise, namely simply deciding whether the defendant has proved the ‘sting’ (i.e. of the ‘single’ meaning established in the first exercise) to be ‘substantially true’. In so doing, the Court does not have to find a ‘single’ meaning or even a range of reasonable meanings in relation to every disputed passage. The Court simply has to decide whether a section of the audience would reasonably take the words spoken to convey a particular message. Thus, if the Court were to conclude that at least a section of the audience would reasonably take the Claimant’s words to carry a particular message, that would be sufficient to support a finding that his words conveyed that message, even if it could not be said with certainty that the words were understood or conveyed the same message to everyone present. 62. I summarise below the extent to which the Jeynes criteria set out above have any utility in the second exercise: (1) Principle (1) of Jeynes, i.e. reasonableness, is clearly key in the second exercise. (2) Principle (2) is relevant but not the caution in the last two lines. (3) Principle (3) is applicable: over-elaborate analysis is to be avoided. It is important to judge the degree of attentiveness which any particular speech is likely 15