Galleries Act 1992 provided a Parliamentary opportunity to insert a further exception if that had been thought desirable. 42. Sixth, if the drawings are part of the collections of the Museum and there is no express or implied exception in the British Museum Act 1963 itself it would require some other statutory authority to justify ignoring the prohibition on dispositions. None has been suggested in this case. There are provisions in the Charities Act 1993 whereby schemes in relation to the funds of a charity regulated by statute may be made subject to obtaining the requisite parliamentary approval, see ss. 15(3) and 17. Similarly there is the jurisdiction to authorise applications to Parliament described by the Lord Chancellor in Re: Shrewsbury Grammar School (1849) 1 Mac & G 324, 333. Though such jurisdiction is rarely exercised now its existence demonstrates that nothing less than some statutory authority is required to justify a departure from statutory obligations imposed on trustees. 43. Seventh, s.3(4) prohibits any disposition by the Trustees. The word “disposition” is not defined. It is of its nature a word of wide import. The context in which it is used does not require a restrictive interpretation; quite the reverse. I see no reason, and none was suggested in argument, to limit its operation to acts so as to exclude omissions. Property in goods may be passed by a failure to act as well as by an active delivery. Consequently I consider that a failure to rely on relevant provisions of the Limitation Acts 1939 and 1980, otherwise than on legal advice, in order to effect a transfer of the drawings to the heirs of Dr Feldmann is as prohibited by s.3(4) as is a delivery by the Trustees. I did not understand the Trustees in the oral argument of their counsel to contend otherwise. 44. Eighth, the cases in which the Court has altered the trusts or other provisions of a charity regulated by statute, namely, Re:Shipwrecked Fishermen and Mariners’ Royal Benevolent Society [1959] Ch.220 and Re Royal Society’s Charitable Trusts [1956] 1 Ch. 87, depend on the proposition that the conferment of a limited power did not in those cases give rise to an implied prohibition against any action outside that limit. The proposition may or may not have been justified in the particular case but that can have no effect on a case such as this when the statutory provision plainly imposes a prohibition and the extent of the prohibition is clear. 45. For all these reasons I conclude that no moral obligation can justify a disposition by the Trustees of an object forming part of the collections of the Museum in breach of s.3(4). There is nothing in the decision of Cross J in Re Snowden to suggest otherwise. The fact, if it be one, that the four considerations which led Cross J to decide that case in the way that he did apply in this case cannot justify a breach of s.3(4). What is required is some statutory authority by way of exception. There is none and it is beyond the power of the Attorney-General to provide one. It follows that I reject the submission that s.3(4) only becomes relevant at the stage when the Attorney-General decides whether or not to exercise the Snowden jurisdiction. The existence of s.3(4) excludes any such jurisdiction in relation to acts or omissions it prohibits. 46. In the case of the Benevento Missal the Spoliation Advisory Panel concluded that restitution by the Trustees of the British Library was barred by s.3(5) British Library Act 1972 applying s.3(4) British Museum Act 1963. In paragraph 77 of the report dated 23rd March 2005 (2005 HC 406) the panel under the chairmanship of the Rt Hon Sir David Hirst recommended to the Secretary of State that legislation should be introduced to amend the British Museum Act 1963, The British Library Act 1972 and the Museums and Galleries Act 1992 so as to permit restitution of cultural objects of which possession was lost during the Nazi era (1933-1945). The panel also