regarded as necessary. As the appellant pointed out, it was not as if it was necessary to approach him when off duty. He held regular press conferences when any matter could be raised and when his responses would be subject to the constraints of the code of conduct. 39. The burden is on the defendant to justify the interference with freedom of speech. However offensive and undeserving of protection the appellant’s outburst may have appeared to some, it is important that any individual knows that he can say what he likes, provided it is not unlawful, unless there are clear and satisfactory reasons within the terms of Article 10(2) to render him liable to sanctions. In my view, the Tribunal misdirected itself in deciding that it was proportionate for the Code to extend as far as it did on the Tribunal’s construction. The restraint was not in my judgment shown to be necessary in a democratic society even though the higher level of protection appropriate for the expression of political opinion was not engaged. 40. I turn to the submission that there was no breach of Paragraph 4 because by what he said the appellant did not bring his office or authority into disrepute. The Tribunal dealt with this in Paragraph 74 of its decision, saying:“The Case Tribunal can see a theoretical possibility that damage can be caused to the reputation of an individual holding an office without damage being caused to the reputation of the office itself. In practice, however, there is a very real risk that damage to the reputation of the former seeps across to cause damage to the latter. The higher the profile of the post and the more the postholder seeks to stamp his individuality on the office the harder it is to envisage circumstances where damage to his own reputation does not also cause damage to the reputation of the office. In the view of the Case Tribunal the reasonable onlooker would regard Mr Livingstone’s own reputation as being diminished as a result of the exchange and having reached that view, bearing in mind Mr Livingstone’s profile and the difficulty of separating him as an individual from the role of the office he holds, have also concluded that the remarks have had the effect of damaging the reputation of his office as Mayor.” 41. In my view, the distinction is more than theoretical. There is a danger in regarding any misconduct as particularly affecting the reputation of the office rather than the man. If a councillor commits sexual misconduct or is convicted of theft, I do not think the reputation of the office is thereby necessarily brought into disrepute. His certainly will be. If the high profile test is correct, anything done by the appellant which can be regarded as improper may fall within Paragraph 4, however remote from his official position. Having said that, I recognise the force of the Tribunal’s view of the difficulty in separating the man from the office. I have no doubt that the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that what he said did bring him into disrepute. I am less clear that in reality it was right to say that the office of Mayor was brought into disrepute. While the appellant has a high profile as Mayor, I doubt that many people would regard what he did as bringing disrepute on the office rather than on him personally. Misuse of the office can obviously bring disrepute on the office, but personal misconduct will be unlikely to do so. I think the Tribunal applied a test which failed to recognise the real distinction between the man and the office and I am not persuaded that his conduct did fall within Paragraph 4. I appreciate Mr Morshead’s point that the appellant occupies an office in which he exercises real power over the lives of millions of people and so has an unique position with unique powers. This means that he has responsibilities and people,