Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. [2025] EWHC 1170 (Admin) AC-2024-LON-001310 HUSAIN v SRA offensive and disparaging’: Facebook posts which were ‘targeted and misogynistic’ such as was found in a 2018 Tribunal decision.” At [44], the panel said: “…given the importance ascribed to freedom of expression in the authorities referred to above (and many of the others to which we were referred at the hearing), it follows that, for the expression of a political belief to be such that it diminishes the trust of the public in the particular barrister or in the profession as a whole will require something more than the mere causing of offence. At the very least, the relevant speech would have to be ‘seriously offensive’ or ‘seriously discreditable’ as suggested in the Handbook Guidance. Even in such cases there would have to be a close consideration of the facts to establish that the speech had gone beyond the wide latitude allowed for the expression of a political belief, particularly where the speech was delivered without any derogatory or abusive language and the objection was taken to the political belief or message being espoused, rather than the manner in which that belief or message was being delivered.” At [45]-[46] the panel said that any guidance given by the by the regulator had to be read “bearing in mind the hierarchy of free speech values”. At [47], it said that the case law on free speech dictated that “the baseline for a breach of CD5 should be set higher than merely that a comment would simply offend”. The IDP’s finding that the tweet would cause offence therefore fell short of establishing the type of conduct that was necessary for a breach of the relevant professional duty. 81. Although the reasoning of the panel does not appear to have been referred to in any reported decision, both parties accepted that the approach set out by the panel was correct. I would respectfully endorse the parts of the panel’s reasoning I have set out above as a correct statement of principle, applicable to any case where a regulator takes disciplinary action against a professional on the basis of public speech on a political issue on the ground that it is offensive. Did the Tribunal err? 82. The Tribunal’s judgment was detailed and comprehensive. At [26.16.5], it accurately recorded Mr Husain’s submission that, even if it were to conclude that any of the tweets were offensive/antisemitic, it would still have to consider whether this amounted to professional misconduct; and that this required consideration of Mr Husain’s Article 10 rights (as explained in Adil) and “the high level at which the bar must be set before a regulator can properly seek to interfere with a professional’s Article 10 rights” (as set out in Holbrook). At [26.16.19], it also recorded Mr Husain’s reliance on the passage from Sedley J’s judgment in Redmond-Bate which I have set out above. 83. At [27.11], the Tribunal said that its task was “to make findings of fact as to whether the Respondent’s specific mode and manner of that expression had crossed from legitimate debate into antisemitism and/or the use of offensive, or inappropriate language, resulting in a breach of his professional duties and responsibilities” (emphasis added). At [27.22], the Tribunal said that it was permissible to analyse the