Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Ismaik v Fadaat Media 64. I consider this entirely an expression of opinion, for the reasons set out in this analysis. It is a theory – an exercise in critiquing the Foreign Policy article with the rhetorical tropes of anti-‘Zionism’. The contention that there is an underlying imputation of fact here – beyond that Mr Ismaik’s name is on the article and that he benefited financially from that – is in my view something of a category error. This article is a piece of political polemic, and what is said about Mr Ismaik is instrumental to the polemic, not the other way around. Mr Ismaik may well feel the part written for him is salient and unattractive, but determining preliminary issues in defamation proceedings requires a definitively less subjective perspective on the play as a whole. Some of the meanings and imputation he fears it imparts in my view proceed from an over-literal approach to a highly rhetorical genre, and a closer, more anxious, reading, and/or search for personal meaning, than an ordinary, reasonable reader would bring to the consumption of material of this sort. (d) Defamatory tendency 65. As to whether, in the meaning I have found, this is defamatory, I was asked to look at what is said in Prince Moulay of Morocco v Elaph Publishing [2017] 4 WLR 28 at [36]. It may or may not be defamatory to suggest that someone is working against the interests of an institution or ruler – or, it may be, a cause or nation. That is a highly fact-sensitive question. The Court in Prince Moulay gave weight to whether a meaning suggested someone was acting dishonourably by undermining rules to which he subscribed while pretending to be bound by them; and whether an article was capable of being regarded by the public generally as an attack on a person’s integrity and character such as would tend seriously to harm his reputation in the eyes of reasonable people. 66. In the meaning of the ‘authorship’ allegation I have found, Mr Ismaik’s political stance in the Foreign Policy article, as the journalist describes it, is criticised for being an ‘extremist right-wing Zionist view’. Mr Ismaik is criticised for espousing it as such, and also because of the journalist’s view that it is irreconcilable with the national interest of Palestinians and Jordanians. He is further criticised on the one hand for lending it apparent credibility as a Jordanian of Palestinian heritage, and on the other for being a nobody who, in fact, lends it no credibility at all. And he is criticised for being paid for it with ‘Zionist’ money. 67. To call someone a political extremist is to put them outside the political mainstream. In a highly polarised political context, to ascribe to someone extreme political views opposed to your own, may also be to ascribe to them support for and sympathy with a whole history of causes of deep grievance about which you feel profoundly. It may further be to focus and personalise your condemnation of their politics to condemnation of them for espousing them. If you think your political opponents are colonialists or worse, then that is harsh and bitter criticism indeed. 68. But whether a critique of this sort is also defamatory depends on whether it crosses a line between vehement partisan political critique (not excluding name-calling), and imputations of transgressing the common shared values of our society – an attack on personal integrity and character in itself. The word ‘values’ is important here. We live in a plural cultural and political democracy in which diversity of opinion and belief is itself valued. There is no ‘value’ in our society which is incontestably allied to one position or another in that most tragic of problems, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or