84.
In my judgment it is quite probable that in the case of Rabbi Meisels as in the case of
Mr Fisher, Mr. Lichtman’s enthusiasm in promoting the interests of the charity may
have led him to misunderstand what the other party was intending or agreeing to. Mr.
Lichtman knew that the charity had an urgent need of further funds, whether for the
Craven Walk synagogue or otherwise. I am sure that he can be a forceful advocate
for the cause, and I conclude that his prime concern would be to obtain funds by one
means or another. He might have assumed that any funds he obtained could be treated
as gifts or merely hoped that a loan given in one set of circumstances would be
converted into an outright gift by an apparently wealthy member of the Stamford Hill
orthodox community who shared some sympathies with the aims of the Israel charity
and who could be prevailed on to show solidarity.
85.
I recognise the point made forcefully by Mr. Hornett on behalf of the Defendants that
if this was the commercial transaction that the Claimant states, it is extraordinary that
he did not respond to the failures to collect in January by a clear statement of his case
and start proceedings to secure the return of his monies. I conclude that this is not
simply a commercial transaction between the parties. Here again the cultural
background to this case is of significance. It concerns religious and charitable
functions likely to be recognised as of importance to both. It concerns personal
relations inside the Hasidic community in North London, social standing, mutual
respect and esteem. I am conscious from the numbers of people attending court and
indeed the evidence of the Second Defendant that this dispute is of considerable
interest in the broader community of observant Jews. In such a context there may
well be reluctance to stand on legal rights to the prejudice of an esteemed charity by
pressing for a return of funds that were apparently urgently needed for philanthropic
purposes.
86.
There would be understandable reluctance to turn to the machinery of the civil courts,
solicitors and formal recovery procedures. There may also be reluctance to undermine
personal business relations in Stamford Hill and possibly create scandal or social
turmoil by instituting proceedings in the rabbinical courts either in the UK or the US.
87.
The impression I have of the Claimant from the witness box is of a reserved quiet and
personal man who would avoid conflict and social turmoil if he could. He appears to
have depended on personal trust and honour in his dealings with the charity, rather
than resort to professional advisers and professionally drafted agreements that he
delegated to others to execute.
88.
The Defendants point out that when the claim was expressed formally in
correspondence in February 2006 it was confused and inconsistent as to the sums. I
have already made some observations on this letter. As against the criticism of
inconsistency by the Claimant, it can be said that the Claimant was clear from
December 2005 that both transactions were loans. The First Defendant did not assert
that the payments were gifts in the correspondence with the BDZ. They are not even
said to be gifts in the Defence drafted in June 2006, it is merely asserted that they
were assumed to be.
89.
I further consider that the November text message is a pointer much more consistent
with the Claimants case than the First Defendants. I take note of the proposition that
a text is not a contract and cannot be construed as such, but I find it quite impossible
to read the phrase “I will send the money” as “if you want a loan fill in the necessary