Gestel said that there may be circumstances - acts or failures to act – that have the effect of affirming the existence of a contract despite there having been one or more repudiations. 74. The expert’s answers in relation to issues 7 and 8 and the subsequent part 35 questions appear to be somewhat confusing and require careful analysis. Issue 7 asked him to give his opinion whether the party not in repudiatory breach could treat the contract as automatically terminated and whether he could elect to treat the contract as continuing by affirmation. Automatic termination does not occur, the injured party must do something before the contract terminates. It is in this context that Judge van Gestel referred to Clauses 10 and 11. 75. Clause 11 provides that the contract may not be waived, amended, or the obligations thereunder terminated in whole or in part except by writing executed by all the parties. It is difficult to follow how, as a matter of any common law system, it would be necessary for a party wishing to treat a contract as at an end for repudiatory breach, to be required to obtain the agreement of the repudiating party that this was the case. If, as appears to be the case, there is a concept of repudiatory breach in Massachusetts law, which enables the other party to take steps to treat further performance at an end by some act or notice – or application to the court – then Clause 11 would prevent this is Judge van Gestel’s opinion is taken literally. He does not explain how Clauses 10 and 11 would operate in these circumstances. 76. The Claimant asked a part 35 question about this, pointing out that there might have been a misunderstanding about what was meant by affirmation in the context of this case. He was also referred to a decision of his own (Tomer v Hollister Associates Inc, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 487). In his response, he says that there can be acts or failures to act that can amount to affirmation of the contract, but does not develop or explain his point on Clauses 10 and 11. If the contract continues following a repudiatory breach until the injured party takes some step treating it at an end, then there doesn’t appear to be much difference between English and Massachusetts law. A repudiatory breach does not relieve the other party of further performance unless and until there is an acceptance of the breach and he can’t do this if he has affirmed the contract in the knowledge of the breach in the meantime. 77. In Tomer, there was also an integration clause in similar terms to the contract in this case. The case wasn’t directly about affirmation of an agreement after a repudiatory breach, but the decision by Judge van Gestel to order summary judgment for the defendant was made on the basis that an integration clause did not always require a written document signed by both parties. In that case, the parties’ emails affirming that the parties were continuing to perform the contract notwithstanding that the defendant had unilaterally reduced the defendant’s wages, at least amounted to a variation of the original agreement by email exchange notwithstanding the integration clause. 78. I therefore conclude that the integration clause does not prevent a party who has not accepted a repudiatory breach as freeing him from further performance, from continuing to be bound by the contract if he acts on the footing that the contract is continuing or gives the other party notice that he considers it to be continuing. Alternatively, an agreement to treat the contract as continuing does not fall foul of the integration clause if it is in emails between the parties following the breach.