Judgment approved by the court for handing down Mr J Logo v Payone Gmbh and others proceedings under section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998 : see Dunn v Parole Board [2009] 1 WLR 728, paras 30–32, 43, 48 ; and Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] 2 AC 72, para 75 . “19. That said, factors which are almost always relevant to consider when exercising any discretion whether to extend time are: (a) the length of, and reasons for, the delay and (b) whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh). “20. The second point to note is that, because of the width of the discretion given to the employment tribunal to proceed in accordance with what it thinks just and equitable, there is very limited scope for challenging the tribunal’s exercise of its discretion on an appeal. It is axiomatic that an appellate court or tribunal should not substitute its own view of what is just and equitable for that of the tribunal charged with the decision. It should only disturb the tribunal’s decision if the tribunal has erred in principle—for example, by failing to have regard to a factor which is plainly relevant and significant or by giving significant weight to a factor which is plainly irrelevant—or if the tribunal’s conclusion is outside the very wide ambit within which different views may reasonably be taken about what is just and equitable: see Bexley Community Centre (trading as Leisure Link) v Robertson [2003] IRLR 434, para 24 .” [emphasis added] 28. In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board Leggatt LJ firmly rejected an argument that in order to exercise the discretion to apply a time limit in excess of three months there must be a good excuse for any delay: 25. I cannot accept that argument. As discussed above, the discretion given by section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 to the employment tribunal to decide what it “thinks just and equitable” is clearly intended to be broad and unfettered. There is no justification for reading into the statutory language any requirement that the tribunal must be satisfied that there was a good reason for the delay, let alone that time cannot be extended in the absence of an explanation of the delay from the claimant. The most that can be said is that whether there is any explanation or apparent reason for the delay and the nature of any such reason are relevant matters to which the tribunal ought to have regard. Nor do I consider that the original decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal went any further than that. The error identified by Langstaff J, as I read his judgment, was that the tribunal had failed to give any consideration at all to the reason for the delay in bringing the claim and had therefore failed to have regard to a relevant factor. I agree, however, with Judge Shanks in para 27 of his judgment given on the second Employment Appeal Tribunal appeal that Langstaff J was not “intending to suggest that if a claimant gives no direct evidence about why she did not bring her claims sooner a tribunal is obliged to infer that there was no acceptable reason for the delay, or even that if there was no acceptable reason that would inevitably mean that time should not be extended.” [emphasis added] © EAT 2025 Page 11 [2025] EAT 95