Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Solicitor General v Millinder 38. In advance of the hearing, the members of the Court had already considered for themselves whether the fair and independent-minded observer would be concerned about my ability to deal with the application fairly and dispassionately. We had each independently considered the points made in Mr Millinder’s email and formed a provisional view. We then discussed the matter, and were in agreement that there would be no such concerns. No new points were subsequently raised in oral argument. 39. There is no conflict involved in a judge who made the original order hearing an application for committal based upon alleged breaches of that order. In a case such as this, some familiarity with the complex history of the proceedings and of the underlying dispute is an advantage. A litigant in person cannot engineer the recusal of a judge simply by making false allegations of corruption and criminality against them, using the fact that the judge concerned knows them to be false as a basis for claiming that there is a conflict. Most significantly, perhaps, the fair and independent-minded observer would be aware that the Court of Appeal had upheld the validity of the section 42 Order and had dismissed as unarguable Mr Millinder’s challenges to it on the basis of the alleged conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, of which there is and was no evidence. 40. The other member of the constitution, Mr Justice Cavanagh, has had no prior dealings with or knowledge of Mr Millinder. I myself had no knowledge of any of the events that had occurred after the making of the section 42 order, including the appeal, until I came to read the papers in preparation for the hearing. The alleged acts of contempt 41. None of the correspondence with Mr Justice Fancourt or his clerk or with HH Judge Prince complained of by the Solicitor General concerns an application under section 42. The fact of the correspondence therefore establishes a breach of paragraph 10 of the section 42 order, subject to proving the identity of the person who engaged in the correspondence. Likewise, if it is proved that the application to the Crown Court at Newcastle to re-open Mr Millinder’s conviction was made by Mr Millinder, he did not obtain the prior leave of the High Court as required by paragraph 6 of the section 42 order, and therefore the application was a breach of that paragraph. 42. The burden of proving the acts of contempt lies on the Solicitor General and the standard is the criminal standard. The Divisional Court had to be sure, in the case of each of the fifteen emails, that Mr Millinder sent it. Category 1: Emails sent to Mr Justice Fancourt or his clerk 43. Eight emails were sent to Mr Justice Fancourt in the period from 24 September 2021 to 13 November 2021. Two further emails were sent to his clerk on 7 December 2021. By that date, Mr Millinder must have known that Lord Justice William Davis had confirmed the validity of the section 42 Order and refused permission to appeal against it. The email addresses which were used by the sender were ones that were used by Mr Millinder to send other correspondence. The style is distinctive, and in some cases the author signed them “Paul Millinder”. In other cases, the author signed as “Intelligence UK International SA,” which is a name that Mr Millinder is 10