referred to two schools of thought amongst Salafi Muslims. The first is the Madkhalis13 who believe that engaging in any political action is forbidden, because only God can rule. The second comprises other ‘activist’ Salafi Muslim groups who believe that activism in shaping government and regulating society is in line with Shar’ia. I do not see, however, how this explains or ameliorates the Claimant’s reference to wajib and his plain words “duty to hate”; nor how this limits the object of Claimant’s ire simply to errant Islamic states (i.e. who do not apply Shari’a fully or correctly) rather all non-conforming states, including Western states. The words which the Claimant uses are quite general (“Every State which does not rule in accordance with Allah’s (fasiq) is [evil or rebellious against God’s Law] and unjust. ...”) 238. Professor Gleave’s subsequent, somewhat unedifying, attempt during crossexamination then to dissemble on the Claimant’s endorsement of Sheikh bin Baz’s views was rightly described by Mr Caldecott QC as ‘dancing on the head of a pin’. Professor Gleave also equivocated to some extent on the technical meaning of religious duty (wajib) in Shar’ia, but accepted the following proposition put to him by Mr Caldecott QC during cross-examination: an audience is likely to take from a Chief Imam who describes something as a religious duty as a religious duty. 239. Professor Gleave sought to suggest that the Claimant was not calling on others to go and fight, but merely asking them to support and make prayers (du’a) for those where fighting in legitimate jihad to whom benefits would accrue. He also suggested that, the Claimant’s support for jihad in the physical sense did not extend beyond the use of the proportionate self-defence in circumstances where Muslims were being attacked in their own countries. I do not accept these arguments. What the Claimant referred to as “legitimate” jihad is not what moderate, mainstream Muslims would condone (i.e. in Sheikh bin Baz’s words “…destroying the disbelievers and hypocrites…” and “… fighting the Jews in an Islamic Jihad...” etc.). Further, by no stretch of the language or imagination could this be considered ‘defensive’ jihad. 240. Professor Gleave accepted in his report that the Claimant is clearly influenced by the Salafi approach but said the Claimant is also critical of various Salafi trends, including the exclusivist notion of those who are and not considered to be Muslims (takfiris) and those who consider engagement with secular authorities to be an act of unbelief (kufr), and has himself drawn criticism from some Salafi circles. Be that as it may, these theological differences which the Claimant is said to have with various Salafi strands do not in any way ameliorate or explain the extremist Salafi views on jihad which the Claimant is espousing in the DEVIANT GROUPS SPEECH (2010) set out above. 241. I do not accept Professor Gleave’s suggestion that the Claimant was somehow confusing or eliding the linguistic (lughawi), legal (shar’i) and religious meaning of jihad, or that his position on the meaning of jihad is merely a ‘technical’ one, i.e. that the Claimant is merely explaining that the benefits of being close to Allah are only available to martyrs (shahid) who die fighting in a legitimate jihad. 242. I reject Professor Gleave’s refrain that the Claimant was merely engaged in an act of pedagogic ‘exposition’ in the DEVIANT GROUPS SPEECH (2010) rather than ‘expression’ of his own personal views. In my view, the Claimant is clearly expressing his own personal views in the speech (and his views are, moreover, redolent of Jihadi Salafism). 13 Named after their founder, Rabi Al Madkhali (1931-). Madkhalism is a strand of Salafi-Islamic thought. 54