companies had been adeemed but, in consequence, pecuniary legacies and bequests of shares of residue were much greater than the Testator could have contemplated. The pecuniary and residuary legatees were six charities. They agreed, if the AttorneyGeneral had no objection, that various sums should be paid to the specific legatees. In the case of the will of Florence Henderson a manuscript but unattested addition to the will was omitted from probate. Under the will, as proved, the residue after payment of various pecuniary legacies was left to charity generally. The administrators sought the approval of the Court, if the Attorney-General consented, to give effect to the manuscript alteration. Thus, in each case, approval was sought for a transaction in which charity would forego money to which it was entitled. 18. The argument of counsel for the Attorney-General, as reported, included the following passage (p.706): “It has been a long established view that the Attorney-General has no power to authorise the application of the funds of a charity for non-charitable purposes. This precise problem has been put to counsel for the Attorney-General for over 40 to 50 years. Each counsel has treated it as clear law. In the present case the point of moral obligation has been raised.” 19. In his judgment (p.708) Cross J indicated that he would not be justified in dissenting from that view unless he was satisfied that it was wrong. He was so satisfied. He said (p.710F-G): “In the result I am satisfied that the court and the AttorneyGeneral have power to give authority to charity trustees to make ex gratia payments out of funds held on charitable trusts. It is however a power which is not to be exercised lightly or on slender grounds but only in cases where it can fairly be said that if the charity were an individual it would be morally wrong of him to refuse to make the payment.” 20. Cross J had earlier (pp.709/710) given four reasons for arriving at that conclusion. They may be summarised as follows: (1) As charity depends for its continued existence on the recognition by others of moral obligations to give it would be odd if a charity could not likewise give effect to its own moral obligations. (2) Analogous powers exist in other cases, such as the management of the property of mental patients and what is for the benefit of an infant. (3) In sanctioning compromises on behalf of charities the Court does pay regard to moral obligations. (4) The Attorney-General has power to relieve trustees from their strict legal obligations to make full restitution for breaches of trust committed by them. 21. The authority of the Attorney-General so found by Cross J has been exercised on many occasions since 1970. By s.27 Charities Act 1993 a comparable authority was given to the Charity Commissioners. So far as relevant that section provides: