Conduct did not apply to what the appellant said and so the finding by the Tribunal that there had been a failure to follow the provisions of the Code cannot stand. 32. I must however deal with the appeal on the basis that Paragraph 4 of the Code of Conduct did apply to the circumstances. This involves considering the reasons given by the Tribunal for finding a failure to comply and the arguments put forward by Mr Maurici. In short, he submits that, while the appellant may properly have been considered to have brought himself into disrepute by what he said, he did not bring his office or authority into disrepute. He further submits that it was wrong to decide that the Code extended beyond his official capacity to cover what was said by him since that extension infringed his right of freedom of speech. 33. I shall deal with this latter submission first. The right of freedom of speech has always been recognised by the common law. In Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers [1993] A.C. 534 at p. 551F, Lord Keith observed:“My noble and learned friend, Lord Goff of Chieveley, in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 A.C. 109, 283-284, expressed the opinion that in the field of freedom of speech there was no difference in principle between English law or the subject and Article 10 of the Convention. I agree, and can only add that I find it satisfactory to be able to conclude that the common law of England is consistent with the obligations assumed by the Crown under the Treaty in this particular field.” Article 10 is now incorporated into our law by the Human Rights Act, and so whether a particular restraint on freedom of speech was proportionate has expressly to be considered. It is Mr Maurici’s submission that in this case it was not and he relies in particular upon the government’s response to the reconsideration to which I have already referred that conduct not in an official capacity should only be within the Code if unlawful. That he submits demonstrates that the restraint in this area was disproportionate in that it cannot be said to be necessary in a democratic society. 34. There can be no doubt that restraints imposed by a code of conduct designed to uphold proper standards in public life are in principle likely to be within Article 10(2). But it is important that the restraints should not extend beyond what is necessary to maintain those standards. There has always been a debate over the extent to which conduct in private as opposed to public life should be regulated and that debate continues. The government has, it seems, recognised that Paragraph 4 of the Code may go too far, but that does not of itself mean that it is not necessary in the circumstances. It must, however, raise some doubts. Added to that is the recognition that it is not considered necessary to go that far in Scotland. 35. Mr Maurici has suggested that the appellant was making a political comment so that there is a higher threshold to be surmounted in establishing that the restraint was proportionate. Interference with the right of free speech which impedes political debate must be subjected to particularly close scrutiny: see Sanders v Kingston [2005] LGR 719 in which at p.745h Wilkie J refers to the high level of protection given to expressions of political views. 36. I have no doubt that the appellant was not to be regarded as expressing a political opinion which attracts the high level of protection. He was indulging in offensive abuse of a journalist whom he regarded as carrying out on his newspaper’s behalf activities which