Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. [2025] EWHC 1170 (Admin) AC-2024-LON-001310 HUSAIN v SRA barrister, provided he was fit to practise”. At [55], she said that, in the light of the medical evidence, his behaviour “plainly was not reprehensible, morally culpable or disgraceful, as it was caused by factors beyond his control” and so did not amount to serious professional misconduct. 59. In my judgment, this part of the judgment establishes very little by way of authority. On the facts, the misconduct alleged took place on one evening. The judge considered that the medical evidence showed that the barrister’s disinhibition was caused by factors beyond his control and lacked any reprehensible or morally culpable quality. The nature of the medical evidence, and the judge’s reasons for concluding that it negated his culpability, are set out in a confidential annex to the judgment, so it is not possible to say anything about these. The only proposition of law that can safely be drawn from Howd is that, in principle, medical evidence might be such as to negate culpability. 60. In the present case, the conduct in issue took place over nine months. Dr Zaman said only that Mr Husain’s depression made him “more liable to escalations in confrontation with those around him” and that “[o]n balance the relapse of his depression is likely to have led to him acting without his normal due measure and control”. He did not say that the depression impaired his ability to understand the nature of what he was tweeting, or to take a rational decision about whether to tweet or not. Nor did Dr Zaman say that Mr Husain’s depression caused or even contributed to his tweeting content which was antisemitic, racist and grossly offensive over a period of nine months. As the Tribunal correctly held, there was no evidence of any link between Mr Husain’s medical condition and these critical, objectionable features of his conduct. 61. It follows that, even if Dr Zaman’s report had been admitted as relevant to liability, it would not have been relevant to the Tribunal’s determination whether Mr Husain had breached the SRA Principles, because, taken at its highest, it would not have explained his conduct. In fact, however, the reason why the Tribunal declined to admit Dr Zaman’s report on the issue of liability was that it was four months late. If it had been served on time, the SRA might well have obtained its own evidence in response. This was a proper case management reason for excluding it. 62. The Tribunal did, however, take Dr Zaman’s report into account when deciding what adjustments should be made to ensure that the hearing was fair (as well as in relation to sanction). A review of the transcript of proceedings (which covers some but not all of the hearing) shows that the Tribunal in fact made considerable efforts to assist the appellant. By way of example, the Tribunal provided training on how to navigate the digital system being used, sent Mr Husain guidance notes in advance on issues such as adjournments, assisted him in finding documents and permitted requests for unscheduled breaks (including when Mr Husain said that he needed time to think). 63. The hearing lasted 13 days, spread over 5 months. Mr Husain attended hearings on 1822 September 2023, 18-19 December 2023, 26 and 29 January 2024 and 6, 13 and 20 February 2024. On the final day (23 February 2024) he did not attend but filed written submissions in advance. The Tribunal was well placed to assess for itself whether any further adjustment was required. The transcript and judgment show that Mr Husain advanced his case robustly and fully. There is no proper basis for the suggestion that the Tribunal should have made greater allowances for his medical condition.