Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. [2025] EWHC 1170 (Admin) AC-2024-LON-001310 HUSAIN v SRA 64. Given that there was no evidence that Mr Husain’s medical condition negated his culpability, and that the Tribunal properly considered what adjustments should be made and made those adjustments, there was no need to consider the question whether Mr Husain was disabled for the purposes of the 2010 Act. There is no rule which prevents a court or tribunal from conducting a hearing at which one of the parties has an impairment satisfying the definition of “disability” in s. 6 of the 2010 Act. Conversely, the duty of a court or tribunal under Article 6 ECHR to ensure that the hearing is fair applies even if the impairment in question does not satisfy that definition. In any event, the duties owed by public authorities under s. 29 of the 2010 Act do not apply to those exercising judicial functions, as the Tribunal was: see para. 3 of Sch. 3 to the 2010 Act. 65. These conclusions mean that it is not necessary to consider whether, as a matter of jurisdiction, it is open to Mr Husain to appeal against the Tribunal’s interlocutory decision not to admit Dr Zaman’s report on the issue of liability. On that issue, Mr Solomon for the SRA relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re a Solicitor, The Times, 4 May 1994, for the proposition that appeals under s. 49 of the 1974 Act lie only against final decisions. It may have to be determined in another case whether that decision precludes an appeal in a case such as this, where the Tribunal has made a final (and therefore appealable) decision and it is said that, as a result of the prior interlocutory decision, the final decision is “unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity” within CPR 52.21(3)(b). Ground 2 Submissions for Mr Husain 66. Mr Magennis for Mr Husain submits that the tweets were clearly political speech which should have attracted the highest level of protection under Articles 9 and 10 ECHR. The Tribunal should therefore have asked itself whether the tweets were “seriously offensive�� rather than simply “offensive” or “inappropriate”: see the decision of the Bar Tribunal and Adjudication Service in Holbrook v BSB. Yet in the parts of its decision concerning liability, the Tribunal in fact applied the lower test (see [27.11], [27.22], [27.31], [27.34], [27.36.1], [27.37.7], [27.38.2], [27.38.11], [27.38.12], [27.38.13], [27.38.20], [27.38.23] and [27.39.9]). It referred to the correct test (“seriously offensive and seriously discreditable”) for the first time when dealing with sanction (see [47]), but with no explanation or justification for the shift. 67. In his post-hearing note, Mr Magennis referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Adil v GMC [2023] EWCA Civ 1261, [2024] ICR 445, as setting out the correct approach to Article 10 in regulatory cases. Submissions for the SRA 68. Mr Solomon KC for the SRA notes that, in Ali v SRA, Morris J said at [94] that: “decisions of specialist tribunals are not expected to be the product of elaborate legal drafting. Their judgments should be read as a whole; and in assessing the reasons given, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, it is appropriate to take it that the Tribunal has fully taken into account all the evidence and submissions”.